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PREEMPTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE STATUTES BY
SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: IS AN
AGREEMENT REQUIRED?
INTRODUCTION
States often regulate economic activity in a way that stifles the free
play of market forces.' Such regulation may frustrate the strong federal
policy embodied in Section 1 of the Sherman Act2 favoring uninhibited
competition.3 The supremacy clause of the Constitution4 requires that a
state law must be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment" of the objectives underlying a federal law.5 Thus, Section 1
has been used to challenge the validity of various state regulations on the
ground that they unconstitutionally restrain trade.6
1. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (unless a state
could lawfully affect competition, it would be unable to engage in economic regulation);
Conant, The Supremacy Clause and State Economic Controls: The Antitrust Maze, 10
Hastings Const. L.Q. 255, 264-68 (1983) (discussing when state regulations do or do not
conflict with federal antitrust laws); Werden & Balmer, Conflicts Between State Law and
the Sherman Act, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 2-6 (1982) (discussing how state regulation can
affect competition). But see Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26
J. Law & Econ. 23, 33-35 (1983) (arguing that while regulation limits competition, juris-
dictions compete by the bodies of laws they offer).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
3. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (the Sherman Act is
the "Magna Carta of free enterprise"); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958) (the Sherman Act is a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at pre-
serving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade").
4. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
5. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda
& J. Young, Constitutional Law 292-96 (1983) (discussing preemption). See infra notes
14-18 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982) (designation statute);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (state-
mandated resale price maintenance); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96 (1978) (state provided for hearing procedure by which dealers could delay the
opening of competing dealerships); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state supreme
court rule banned advertising by lawyers); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384
U.S. 35 (1966) (price affirmation statute); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951) (state-mandated resale price maintenance); Battipaglia v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1984) (price posting and adherence to those
prices), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985); Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116 (D. Or.
1984) (price posting and adherence, delivered pricing and prohibition of quantity dis-
counts); Serlin Wine & Spirits Merchants v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936 (D. Conn.) (banning
sales below a statutorily defined cost), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Division of Liquor Con-
trol, 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981).
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In Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,7 the Supreme Court set out two sepa-
rate and distinct analyses' to be made before preemption by Section 1 can
be found. First, a court must decide whether the statute contemplates
conduct that will always violate Section 1' If so, the statute is pre-
empted unless the statutory conduct is determined, under the second
analysis, to be state action."0 It is well established that Congress did not
intend the Sherman Act to be applied to state action no matter how an-
ticompetitive its effect."
Because a state law must mandate a Section 1 violation before Section
1 can be deemed to preempt the state law, Section l's requirement of an
agreement in restraint of trade presents a problem. Several courts have
indicated that state statutes that merely require private parties to per-
form well defined acts, while neither requiring collaboration with other
market participants nor granting control over other market participants,
7. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
8. The tests are separate and distinct because each analysis can be made without
reference to the other. A statute can be upheld if it is state action whether or not the
court determines if it violates the Sherman Act. See George W. Cochran Co. v. Comp-
troller of the Treasury, 292 Md. 3, 7-8, 11, 437 A.2d 194, 196, 198 (1981) (assuming
without deciding that the statute would violate). A statute can also be upheld if it does
not violate the Sherman Act, whether or not it is state action. See Wine & Spirits Spe-
cialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.) (en banc) (not deciding state action
issue), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984).
9. Rice, 458 U.S. at 661.
10. See id. at 662-63 n.9 ("because of our resolution of the pre-emption issue, it is not
necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from invalidation under the
doctrine of Parker v. Brown"). Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), established the
state action doctrine by holding that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit States
from imposing restraints on competition. Id. at 350-52. The state action doctrine immu-
nizes conduct from the antitrust laws. The analysis varies depending on the identity of
the actor. The conduct of a private party is deemed state action if it passes a two-pronged
test. First, the conduct must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy . . . . Second, the State must supervise actively any private anticompetitive con-
duct." Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 1727,
1729 (1985) (citations omitted). If the actor is a municipality, the anticompetitive con-
duct need only satisfy the first prong of the state action test. Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1721 (1985). Dictum indicates that the test for municipali-
ties might also apply to state agencies. Id. at 1720 n.10 (dictum). Where the state itself
chooses to act, such conduct automatically constitutes state action. Hoover v. Ronwin,
104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995-96 (1984). The state itself includes the state legislature or state
supreme court. Id. (plurality decision in which Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor did not
participate).
11. The Court has examined the question of what conduct constitutes state action in a
long series of cases. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States,
105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985);
Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alumi-
num, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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shall not be deemed to require an agreement in restraint of trade."2
These courts conclude that the statutes do not mandate a violation and
thus preemption cannot occur.13 This Note will argue that any statutory
scheme that replaces independent decisionmaking with required con-
certed action contains sufficient agreement for preemption purposes.
Preemption should depend on the anticompetitive effects of the conduct
required and on whether the conduct is deemed to constitute state action.
Part I of this Note will examine the framework for Section 1 preemp-
tion analysis. Part II will analyze the agreement issue and its place in
this framework. Part III will examine the Supreme Court cases relevant
to the agreement issue. Part IV will set out the proper effect the agree-
ment requirement should have on preemption analysis. Part V will argue
that the concerns courts raise in the agreement issue indicate that they
may actually be making a state action determination. Finally, Part VI
will examine fairness questions raised by holding that these statutes con-
tain an agreement sufficient for preemption.
I. PREEMPTION BY SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Preemption analysis protects the constitutionally mandated supremacy
of federal law. 4 In certain situations, federal legislation regarding a
12. See Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Or. 1984); Fisher Foods v. Ohio
Dep't of Liquor Control, 555 F. Supp. 641, 646 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Enrico's Inc. v. Rice,
551 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.
1984); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1329-30 (D. Conn.),
rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd men., 464 U.S. 909 (1983);
Serlin Wine & Spirit Merchants v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936, 939 (D. Conn.), aff'd sub
nor. Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981); Allied Artists
Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 448-49 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. No-
vak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Minn. 1984); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666
S.W.2d 416,418-19 (Mo.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984); J.AJ. Liquor
Store v. New York State Liquor Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 504, 524, 479 N.E.2d 779, 790-91, 490
N.Y.S.2d 143, 154-55 (1985) (Jasen, J., concurring), appealfiled sub nom. 324 Liquor
Corp. v. McLaughlin, 54 U.S.L.W. 3039, 3044 (U.S. June 28, 1985) (No. 84-2022); see
also Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1981) (statute does
not compel agreement). But see Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d
166, 172 n.9 (2d Cir. 1984) (Morgan decided on state action grounds).
13. See Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Or. 1984); Fisher Foods v. Ohio
Dep't of Liquor Control, 555 F. Supp. 641, 646 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Enrico's Inc. v. Rice,
551 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1330 (D. Conn.), rev'd on other
grounds, 692 F.2d 275, (2d Cir. 1982), affld mem., 464 U.S. 909 (1983); Allied Artists
Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 448 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. No-
vak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. 1984); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666
S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984); J.A.J. Liquor
Store v. New York State Liquor Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 504, 524, 479 N.E.2d 779, 791, 490
N.Y.S.2d 143, 155 (1985) (Jasen, J., concurring), appeal filed sub nom. 324 Liquor Corp.
v. McLaughlin, 54 U.S.L.W. 3039, 3044 (U.S. June 28, 1985) (No. 84-2022).
14. See generally Conant, supra note 1, at 259-61 (discussing application of the
supremacy clause); Werden & Balmer, supra note 1, at 40-45 (discussing preemption
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given subject will be found to be exclusive, thus preempting any concur-
rent state legislation.' 5 There are other areas, however, where the federal
government and the states have concurrent power to regulate.' 6 In these
areas, preemption occurs if the state and federal laws actually conflict,
such as "'where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility,' or where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress . ' ."7 In this situation, preemption analysis follows a two-
step process: first, determination of how the state and federal laws are
construed; second, examination of whether they are in irreconcilable
conflict.' 8
The antitrust laws allow coincident state regulation of competition. 9
The Supreme Court enunciated the test for determining when a state
statute is in irreconcilable conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act in
Rice v. Norman Williams Co.2° Different standards apply depending on
whether a statute is attacked on its face or for its effects.2 ' A statute can
be condemned on its face only when it mandates, authorizes or places
irresistible pressure on private parties to engage in conduct constituting a
per se violation22 of Section 123 If the statute does not mandate conduct
where state and federal power is coincident). A state law held to be preempted is invali-
dated. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1363, 1379 (1978).
15. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, (1978), lists three situations where
federal law will exclude any state regulation of a subject. First, pervasive federal regula-
tion can create an inference that Congress intended to occupy the field. Second, a domi-
nant national interest may cause preemption. Third, the federal statute's object or the
character of the obligations it imposes may mandate preemption. Id. at 157-58 (citing
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See generally Werden &
Balmer, supra note 1, at 35-40 (discussing when federal legislation occupies the field);
Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 Stan. L.
Rev. 208, 209-17 (1959) (discussing how the scope of federal statutes is determined).
16. See Werden & Balmer, supra note 1, at 40-46.
17. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (quoting Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
18. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
19. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 130-34 (1978) (state law with
anticompetitive effect upheld to avoid destroying the ability of the states to regulate eco-
nomic activity); Conant, supra note 1, at 264; Werden & Balmer, supra note 1, at 59. See
generally 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 208 (1978) (discussing the interaction
of state and federal antitrust laws); id. % 210 (discussing areas where federal law expressly
defers to state law).
20. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
21. See id. at 661.
22. Conduct characterized as per se unlawful is that which has been found to have a
'pernicious effect on competition' or 'lack[s] . . .any redeeming virtue'" Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). Such conduct "would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979). When a per se rule is applied, a civil violation of the antitrust laws is found
merely by proving that the conduct occurred and that it fell within a per se category.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 (1984); Gough v.
Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-89 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979);
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violating a per se rule, the conduct is analyzed under the rule of reason, 4
which requires an examination of the conduct's actual effects on competi-
tion.25 If unreasonable anticompetitive effects are created, the required
conduct violates Section 126 and the statute is in irreconcilable conflict
with the Sherman Act.27 Then the statutory arrangement is analyzed to
determine whether it qualifies as "state action" and is thereby saved from
preemption. 8
Rice sets out guidelines to aid in preemption analysis. Preemption
see White Motor v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1963) (a per se rule forecloses
analysis of the purpose or market effect of a restraint); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (same). This must be contrasted with rule of reason analysis.
See infra note 24. Conduct considered per se unlawful includes horizontal price-fixing,
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927), market division,
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) and vertical price-fixing, Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980).
23. Rice, 458 U.S. at 661. If a statute does not require a per se violation, then it
cannot be preempted on its face. Id.
24. The rule of reason is said to be the "traditional framework of analysis" to deter-
mine if Section 1 is violated. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977). The inquiry focuses on the restraint's effect on competition. National Soe'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). The court analyzes "facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed,"
id. at 692, to determine the effect on competition in the relevant product market, see
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 45 (1977) (citing United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967)), and geographic market, see United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519 (1948). A restraint violates Section 1 if it
unreasonably restrains trade. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49 (1977); see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (Congress only
intended to prohibit agreements that were "unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions").
25. See Rice, 458 U.S. at 661.
26. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-90
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
27. See Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1984)
(while declining to decide whether a statute required an antitrust violation in a facial
attack, the court left open the possibility of preemption based on the statute's operation),
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985); Lanierland Distribs. v. Strickland, 544 F. Supp. 747,
751 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (plaintiff failed to show anticompetitive effects sufficient to violate
the rule of reason); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.)
(en banc) (declining to decide whether the rule of reason might invalidate a law on the
record before them), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984); United States Brewers Ass'n
v. Director of N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, - 668 P.2d
1093, 1099 (1983) (rejecting a facial attack on a statute but reserving a decision on
whether the actual application of the statute might violate the antitrust laws), appeal
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1581 (1984). But see infra note 149 for a discussion on the possibil-
ity of a much more limited rule of reason preemption analysis.
28. See Rice, 458 U.S. at 662-63 n.9 ("because of our resolution of the pre-emption
issue, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from invali-
dation under the [state action] doctrine"); Capitol Tel. Co. v. New York Tel. Co., 750
F.2d 1154, 1157, 1165 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the state action doctrine protected the
conduct of a private party after assuming that it violated the federal antitrust laws), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2325 (1985); Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 662
(6th Cir. 1982) (even if conduct violated Sherman Act, the statute is saved by the state
action doctrine); Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 124 (D. Or. 1984) (statute violat-
ing Section 1 saved by state action); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n,
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should not occur "simply because in a hypothetical situation a private
party's compliance with the statute might cause him to violate the anti-
trust laws."29 This language suggests that preemption occurs only if eco-
nomic analysis determines that the statutory requirements create "an
unacceptable and unnecessary risk of anticompetitive effect," 3 and does
not occur simply because it is possible to use the statute in an anticompe-
titive manner.3 It should not mean that preemption is impossible when-
ever both procompetitive and anticompetitive results are conceivable.32
Such an interpretation would preclude preemption altogether because
even restraints of trade condemned as per se violations may conceivably
have no anticompetitive effects.33 The per se rule "reflects the judgment
that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them."34
Another important, yet, in the context of Rice, ambiguous guideline
regarding preemption by Section 1 is the Court's statement that a "state
statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the
state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect."' 35 The meaning of
this statement is clarified by examining the three cases cited in Rice to
support the statement.3
6
In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 3 7 automobile manu-
facturers and retail franchisees contended that the Sherman Act pre-
empted a statute requiring manufacturers to secure the permission of a
state board before opening a new dealership if and only if a competing
dealer protested.3" They argued that a conflict existed because the stat-
593 F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (though conduct violates Section 1, state action
saves statute).
29. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
30. Id. at 668 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
31. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 100 n.15 (Ist Cir.) (power to
control others not sufficient for facial preemption where party had no institutional reason
to make anticompetitive decisions especially likely), affld on other grounds, 662 F.2d 102
(lst Cir. 1981) (en bane), affid sub nom. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
(1982); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 15
(E.D.N.C. 1983) (in an oligopolistic market, price posting would result in an antitrust
violation).
32. But cf. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 449 (S.D. Ohio
1980) (indicating that a statute neither requiring nor permitting an anticompetitive col-
laboration gives the private party enough freedom of choice to preclude preemption),
aft'd in part and remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). See infra note 55 for a
citation of cases in which statutes that did not require collaboration among, or grant
control to, private parties were held to lack the agreements necessary for an antitrust
violation.
33. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
34. Id.
35. Rice, 458 U.S. at 659.
36. Id. (citing New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11
(1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 129-34 (1978); Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966)).
37. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
38. Id. at 109.
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ute permitted "auto dealers to invoke state power for the purpose of re-
straining intrabrand competition." 39
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,4° oil companies challenged a
state statute requiring uniform statewide gasoline prices in situations
where the Robinson-Patman Act4 would permit charging different
prices. They reasoned that the Robinson-Patman Act is a qualification of
our "more basic national policy favoring free competition" and that any
state statute altering "the competitive balance that Congress struck be-
tween the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts" should be preempted.42
In both New Motor Vehicle and Exxon, the Court upheld the statutes
and rejected the arguments presented as
merely another way of stating that the ... statute will have an an-
ticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict between the stat-
ute and the central policy of the Sherman Act - 'our charter of
economic liberty'.... Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot itself
constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating the ... statute. For if an
adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a
state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regula-
tion would be effectively destroyed.43
This indicates that not every anticompetitive effect warrants preemp-
tion.' In neither Exxon45 nor New Motor Vehicle4 did the created effect
constitute an antitrust violation. The Rice guideline therefore indicates
that only when the effect unreasonably restrains trade, and is therefore a
violation, can preemption occur.
The third case cited to support the "anticompetitive effect" guideline is
39. Id at 110.
40. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
42. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 133.
43. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978) (quoting
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978)).
44. First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1455 (8th
Cir. 1983) (preventing a party from carrying on its business in a desired manner has an
anticompetitive effect, but insufficient for preemption), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984);
Allied Artists Picture Corp., v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 1982) (incidental
anticompetitive effect does not warrant preemption); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 450-51 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (rejecting argument that statute for-
bidding competitive practice should be preempted because on its face and in effect, it
allowed and fostered competition), affid in part and remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th
Cir. 1982).
45. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 212.3, at 52-3 & n.3 (Supp. 1982) (citing Exxon as
demonstrating that many challenged government activities do not violate the antitrust
laws). In Exxon, the claim was that the statute upset the mix of competitive and an-
ticompetitive actions mandated by the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
46. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110 (1978) (contrast-
ing Schwegmann as a case involving private conduct violating the antitrust laws, unlike
the statute at issue). In addition, New Motor Vehicle appears to have been decided on the
grounds that the conduct involved was state action. See id. at 109-10.
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Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter,47 in which the Court rejected a
facial Sherman Act preemption challenge48 to a statute requiring that
persons selling liquor to wholesalers affirm that the price charged was no
higher than the lowest price at which sales were made anywhere in the
United States during the previous month.49 Since the attack was a facial
one, and the state law required no per se violations, no preemption could
occur.5 0 The Court also rejected the possibility of preemption due to
Sherman Act violations stemming from misuse of the statute. 5' The
Court stated that rather than imposing "irresistible economic pressure"
on sellers to violate the Sherman Act, the statute "appears firmly
anchored to the assumption that the Sherman Act will deter any at-
tempts by the appellants to preserve their. . . price level [in one state]
by conspiring to raise the prices at which liquor is sold elsewhere in the
country."52 Thus, Seagram indicates that when conduct required by a
state statute combines with other conduct that, taken together, consti-
tutes an illegal restraint of trade, liability may be imposed for the re-
straint without requiring preemption of the state statute.
Rice v. Norman Williams Co. supports this misuse limitation on pre-
emption. Rice states that while particular conduct or arrangements by
private parties would be subject to per se or rule of reason analysis to
determine liability, "[tihere is no basis . . . for condemning the statute
itself by force of the Sherman Act."53
Thus, when a state requires conduct analyzed under the rule of reason,
it appears that a court must carefully distinguish rule of reason analysis
for preemption purposes from the analysis for liability purposes. To ana-
lyze whether preemption occurs, the court must determine whether the
inevitable effects of a statutory restraint unreasonably restrain trade. If
they do, preemption is warranted unless the statute passes the appropri-
ate state action tests. But, when the statutory conduct combines with
other practices in a larger conspiracy to restrain trade, or when the stat-
ute is used to violate the antitrust laws in a market in which such a use is
not compelled by the state statute, the private party might be subjected to
antitrust liability without preemption of the statute.
II. THE AGREEMENT ISSUE
A Section 1 violation has three elements. It requires an agreement; the
agreement must unreasonably restrain competition; and there must be an
47. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
48. See id. at 41.
49. See id. at 39-40.
50. Id. at 45-46; see Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1982) (dis-
cussing Seagram).
51. Seagram, 384 U.S. at 45-46.
52. Id.
53. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 662 (1982).
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effect on interstate commerce.54 In challenges to state statutes which re-
quire all competitors to perform particular acts, but which do not grant
control over or require collaboration with other market participants, sev-
eral courts have held that such statutes create no agreement between
competitors and therefore no Section 1 violation warranting preemp-
tion.5 Examples include statutes requiring price affirmation,5 6 statuto-
rily defined cost markups57 or price-posting.58 Such a holding may
54. E.g., Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893,
917 (S.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982); Consolidated Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 640, 648 (D. Kan. 1979); Mardirosian v.
American Inst. of Architects, 474 F.Supp. 628, 636 (D.D.C. 1979).
55. See, eg., Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116,120 (D. Or. 1984); Fisher Foods v.
Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 555 F. Supp. 641, 646 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Enrico's Inc. v.
Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511, 513-15 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th
Cir. 1984); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1329-30 (D. Conn.),
rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), affd mer., 464 U.S. 909 (1983);
Serlin Wine & Spirit Merchants v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936, 939 (D. Conn. 1981), affd
sub nom. Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981); Interconti-
nental Packaging Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 334-35 (Minn. 1984); J.A.J. Liquor
Store v. New York State Liquor Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 504, 524, 479 N.E.2d 779, 791, 490
N.Y.S.2d 143, 154-55, (1985) (Jasen, J., concurring), appeal filed sub nom. 324 Liquor
Corp. v. McLaughlin, 54 U.S.L.W. 3039, 3044 (U.S. June 28, 1985) (No. 84-2022); Ad-
miral Wine & Liquor Co. v. State Liquor Auth., 61 N.Y.2d 858, 861, 462 N.E.2d 146,
146, 473 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (1984) (mem.). See also Battipaglia v. New York State Li-
quor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 170-73 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing without deciding the issue),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985).
56. A price affirmation statute requires that a seller post and sell prices for his goods
that are no higher than the lowest price at which the goods were sold in the nation during
the previous or coming month. E.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,
39-40 (1966) (previous month); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312,
1329 (D. Conn.) (coming month), ree'd, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), ajfd mem., 464
U.S. 909 (1983). One case resting its antitrust preemption analysis on a finding of no
agreement was United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1328-30 (D.
Conn.), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 275 (2nd Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 464 U.S. 909
(1983). Cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966); United
States Brewers Ass'n v. Director of the N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100
N.M. 216, -, 668 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1983) (dismissing a facial attack but reserving judg-
ment on an attack based on a concrete case), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1581 (1984).
57. Statutes forbidding sales below cost are also characterized as mandatory markup
statutes and loss leader statutes. These statutes set a minimum price consisting of statu-
torily defined factors and a markup. Several cases uphold such statutes as not requiring
an agreement. See Fisher Foods v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 555 F. Supp. 641, 646
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (also holding that the statute satisfied the state action test); Serlin Wine
& Spirit Merchants v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936, 939 (D. Conn. 1981) (also holding that
the statute satisfied the state action action test); J.A.J. Liquor Store v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 64 N.Y.2d 504, 524, 479 N.E.2d 779, 791, 490 N.Y.S.2d 143, 154-55
(1985) (Jasen, J., concurring) (Judge Jasen also felt the statute met the state action test),
appealfiled sub nom. 324 Liquor Corp. v. McLaughlin, 54 U.S.L.W. 3039, 3044 (U.S.
June 28, 1985) (No. 84-2022). Other cases uphold such statutes on state action grounds
alone. See Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1981) (also
containing language regarding agreement, but not decided on this ground); George W.
Cochran Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 292 Md. 3, 7, 11, 437 A.2d 194, 196, 198
(1981) (finding state action without deciding whether there was a violation). Other cases
cite the similar purpose of these laws and the antitrust laws as preventing any conflict
warranting preemption. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Bak-
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preclude deciding whether the statute unreasonably restrains trades 9 or
whether the statute satisfies the state action doctrine.'
The conclusion that no agreement sufficient for preemption by Section
1 is present in conduct mandated by these statutes flows from the follow-
ing reasoning. Statutes requiring competitors to perform particular acts
require only unilateral activity of each individual competitor.6 I A statu-
tory framework requiring all competitors to engage in the same conduct
is not seen as sufficient to establish a Section 1 agreement. 62 Thus, this
ing Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1050 n.62 (9th Cir. 1981) (also decided on grounds that the
anticompetitive effect of the statute was insufficient for preemption), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); Baseline Liquors v. Circle K Corp., 129 Ariz. 215, 222, 630 P.2d 38, 45
(Ct. App.) (such a statute is not a price-fixing statute violative of the Sherman Act), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981); Walker v. Bruno's Inc., 650 S.W.2d 357, 367 (Tenn. 1983)
(statute does the opposite of conflict with the Sherman Act); Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co.
v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 156 (W. Va. 1984) (same purpose
prevents conflict). But see Kentucky Milk Mktg. & Antimonopoly Comm'n v. Kroger
Co., 691 S.W.2d 893, 899-900 (Ky. 1985) (striking down statute as violating state consti-
tution but also cognizant that such statutes violate the Sherman Act).
58. Price posting statutes require that a competitor post his prices with the state and
adhere to them for a period with limited opportunity to change the prices. The prices are
made available to all competitors. Cases upholding these statutes as requiring no agree-
ment include Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Or. 1984); Enrico's Inc. v.
Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511, 513-15 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th
Cir. 1984); Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. 1984)
(also holding that the state action test was satisfied); Wine & Spirits Speciality, Inc. v.
Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Mo.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984);
Admiral Wine & Liquor Co. v. State Liquor Auth., 61 N.Y.2d 858, 861, 462 N.E.2d 146,
147, 473 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (1984) (mem.); cf. Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 177 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding the statute on the grounds that the
statute did not require a violation in all cases in a facial attack and that the statute was a
proper exercise of the authority reserved to the state by the twenty-first amendment);
M.H. Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 14 Mass. App. Ct.
973, 975, 438 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98, (1982) (statute met state action test). But see Knud-
sen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1982) (lower
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the anticompetitive effect of a price
posting statute would cause irreparable harm to the public); Flav-O-Rich v. North Caro-
lina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 15-17 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding the statute violated
the antitrust laws, but was saved by state action); Lewis-Westco & Co. v. Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Appeals Bd., 136 Cal. App. 3d 829, 840, 186 Cal. Rptr. 552, 560 (preempt-
ing the statute), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); see also Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v.
Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 217 Neb. 487, 496, 351 N.W.2d 701, 706-07 (1984)
(price posting was a price-fixing statute and thus invalid under the due process clause of
the state constitution). But see, infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion that Miller was decided on no violation grounds.
59. See, e.g, Enrico's Inc. v. Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as
moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1984); Admiral Wine & Liquor Co. v. State Liquor Auth.,
61 N.Y.2d 858, 861, 462 N.E.2d 146, 147, 473 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (1984) (mem.).
60. Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.) (en banc),
appeal dismissed, 105 S. ,Ct. 56 (1984).
61. Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Or. 1984); Enrico's Inc. v. Rice, 551
F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1330 (D. Conn.), rev'd on other
grounds, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), affid mem., 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
62. See Enrico's Inc. v. Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511, 513-15 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (rejecting
claim that statute was "glue" providing agreement), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th
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approach concludes that when competitors are compelled by statute to
engage in parallel conduct, such arrangements differ from arrangements
created by private agreements and so avoid impinging on the congres-
sional antitrust objectives served by limiting Section 1 to restraints cre-
ated by agreement.63 These cases would appear to limit preemption by
Section 1 to statutes that either require collaboration between market
participants or give certain market participants the power to control the
conduct of other market participants."4
III. THE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has analyzed a range of restraints created by state
statutes that were challenged on preemption grounds.6" Examining sev-
eral of these helps determine the kinds of statutory frameworks that pro-
vide a sufficient agreement for Section 1 preemption.
In Parker v. Brown,6 6 the Court dealt with a state statute authorizing
the establishment of marketing programs. The Court characterized the
statute's purpose as to restrict competition among producers and to
maintain the producers' prices.67 The statute created a procedure by
which a commission chosen by the producers could create a marketing
scheme which, if approved by the competitors, was intended to stabilize
the market by limiting when and how much of each producer's product
would be sold.68 The Court assumed that this conduct would violate
Section 1 if privately organized, 69 but that the conduct was not subject to
Section 1 because it was state action.70
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,7' the state bar, a state agency under
Virginia law,72 was held to have violated Section 1 by punishing devia-
tion from minimum fee schedules set by the county bars,73 which were
private parties.74 The state bar had been insufficiently authorized by the
Cir. 1984); Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. 1984)
(statute is not the equivalent of an agreement).
63. See Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 1984)
(summarizing the appeal of this approach as the fact that "state compulsion of individual
action is the very antithesis of an agreement").
64. This is because a finding of no agreement is sufficient to preclude preemption, see
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text, and because this finding occurs, under the
rationale outlined supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text, whenever parties are simply
required to perform an act.
65. While not all relevant to the discussion here, these would include the state action
cases cited in supra note 11.
66. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
67. See id. at 346.
68. Id at 346-48.
69. See id at 350.
70. See id at 352.
71. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
72. Id. at 789-90.
73. See id. at 791-92.
74. See id at 790.
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state to make its conduct state action. 7- Though a violation was found,
this case is analogous to a situation where the regulations of a state
agency are preempted.
These cases indicate that authorization or compulsion by state govern-
mental authority of collaboration between private competitors regarding
anticompetitive practices may be preempted by Section 1 if the collabora-
tion does not meet the standards for state action. For example, a state's
requirement that private parties collaborate to fix their prices, without
supervising the prices set, would be preempted.76 Therefore, such collab-
oration must be an agreement sufficient to satisfy the violation element of
preemption analysis.
In two cases, the Court has struck down statutes authorizing primarily
vertical restraints. The first was Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distill-
ers Corp. 77 The statute authorized liquor distributors to enforce the re-
sale price maintenance provisions of a contract entered into with one
retailer against all retailers in the state.78 Resale price maintenance is a
per se violation of Section 1.71 Yet contracts authorized by state law
were exempted from the application of the antitrust laws by the Miller-
Tydings Act at that time.8 0 Nevertheless, the Court struck down the
provision enforcing such contracts against nonsigners8 1 In the second
case, California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc. ,82 the statute required wine producers and wholesalers to file "fair
trade" contracts or price schedules with the state."3 If producers had not
set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers were required to post
a resale price.8 4 Retailers could sell only at prices either set out in a fair
trade contract or posted. 5 In addition, the state was divided into trading
areas.8 6 Prices posted by a single wholesaler bound all other wholesalers
in that trading area.
Another statute imposing what was characterized 7 as a vertical non-
price restraint was analyzed in Rice v. Norman Williams Co.88 The stat-
ute gave brand owners the power to limit the persons who could import
75. Id.
76. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 1 213b, at 74.
77. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
78. Id. at 387 & n.2.
79. See id. at 386.
80. Id. The Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
81. See Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 395.
82. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
83. Id. at 99. A "fair trade" contract was one giving a seller the power to set the price
at which others would resell goods purchased from it.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 99-100.
87. The Supreme Court implicitly rejected the horizontal characterization given the
statute by the California Court of Appeal by holding that it was a nonprice vertical re-
straint. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 658, 661-62 (1982).
88. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
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the brand owner's brand into that state from other states.8 9 The statute
only allowed importation of a brand by someone authorized by the brand
owner or the brand owner's authorized agent.9' Since vertical nonprice
restraints are subject to the rule of reason,9' the Court held that this
statute could not be preempted by a facial attack.92
These cases show that the agreement element raises no obstacles to
preemption where the state enforces the ability of one party to control
another party. The Court's language in Rice requiring a "violation" 9
referred to a determination of whether the required restraint unreasona-
bly restrained trade. It was not intended to incorporate into preemption
analysis all of the agreement analysis developed to determine private
liability.
In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, however, the conduct in-
volved was imposed by the state legislature. 94 The statute did not require
any collaboration between, or grant any control over, other market par-
ticipants.95 The Court might have held that preemption was precluded
by the absence of an agreement, since no elements of collaboration or
control were present.96 Instead, the Court determined, as in Rice, that a
restraint analyzed under the rule of reason could not be preempted on its
face by Section 1.9 7 Seagram appeared to focus preemption analysis on
the acts of each individual competitor by stating that "[t]he bare com-
pilation, without more, of price information on sales to wholesalers and
retailers to support the affirmations filed with the State Liquor Authority
would not of itself violate the Sherman Act." 98 Yet, to support this state-
ment, the Court cited a case dealing with whether an agreement to dis-
seminate particular categories of information among competitors would
necessarily tend to lessen production arbitrarily or to raise prices,99 not
with whether an agreement was present. Thus, Seagram actually focused
on the anticompetitive effect of a restraint imposed on all competitors by
89. Id at 656-57.
90. Id
91. Id at 661.
92. See id
93. See id
94. See 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966).
95. See id at 45 (statute only required the individual compilation of price information
to support the requirements of the price affirmation statute).
96. See United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1329-30 (D. Conn.)
(price affirmation statute did not require an agreement and thus was not preempted),
rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
97. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 660-62 (1982) (discussing Sea-
gram and analogizing it to Rice).
98. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966).
99. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 585 (1925) (cited in
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966)). The Court underscored
this emphasis on the type of information made available by comparing Maple Flooring
with American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), wherein it
was held that the degree and type of information exchanged was such that a conspiracy to
restrain trade would result.
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a statutory framework, not the conduct required of each competitor.
The Court did not view the congressional objectives in limiting Section 1
to restraints created by agreements as limiting preemption to statutes in-
volving collaboration or granting control because if it had, cases finding
no agreement would have been cited.
IV. THE PROPER LIMITS ON PREEMPTION SET BY THE AGREEMENT
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1
The congressional purpose behind limiting Section 1 to restraints cre-
ated by agreement was to preserve independent markets. 1o This purpose
was summarized in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.: 0 '
Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It
deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking
that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or
more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are
combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only
reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but
suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular
direction. 102
The rationale underlying the agreement requirement in Section 1 is
that so long as market participants respond independently to economic
conditions, the self-regulating market mechanism of competitors can en-
sure allocative efficiency. 103 Agreements, however, allow market partici-
pants to subvert competition by concerted action that can limit the
number of choices available in the market. o4
Statutes that require parallel conduct eliminate individual responses to
market conditions more effectively than private agreements because pri-
vate cartels are often unstable due to the diverging self interests of the
participants as market conditions change.'0 5 This instability cannot oc-
cur when the restraint is enforced by the state.
100. This can be seen in Senator Sherman's emphasis that the bill would only "prevent
and control combinations made with a view to prevent competition", 21 Cong. Rec. 2457
(1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman), and would not affect lawful combinations that did
"not combine to prevent competition," id. Senator Pugh, who, as a member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, was second only to Sherman in importance to the legislative history
of the statute, Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9-11 J.L. &
Econ. 7, 17 (1966), stated that trusts and combinations were contrary to the public policy
of the United States because they "hinder, interrupt, and impair the freedom and fairness
of commerce with foreign nations and among the States." 21 Cong. Rec. 2558 (1890)
(remarks of Sen. Pugh).
101. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
102. Id. at 2741.
103. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (competition is the
best way to ensure allocative efficiency).
104. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951)
("when a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private con-
duct which the Sherman Act forbids").
105. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 318, at 346-49 (3d ed. 1981).
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To some extent, all business regulation undermines the congressional
desire to prevent concerted market action embodied in the agreement
requirement. However, the creation of concerted market action is not
enough for preemption by Section 1. Two limits on the types of con-
certed action which may be preempted prevent vast categories of state
regulation from being rendered void. First, the concerted action must
unreasonably restrain trade.'06 Second, the restraint must not be state
action. 107
Because statutes imposing restraints on each market participant create
concerted action that undermines the purpose of the agreement require-
ment of Section 1, preemption should not be limited to statutes requiring
collaboration or granting control. Whether a statute requires each pri-
vate party to engage in conduct sufficient for Section I liability should be
irrelevant.10 8 Any statutory framework eliminating independent deci-
sionmaking with regard to trade practices must be examined to deter-
mine its anticompetitive effect and whether the restraint constitutes state
action.
This analysis gains support, and an approach incorporating agreement
analysis for determining liability is discredited, in Schwegmann Brothers
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., where the Court struck down a state law en-
forcing resale price maintenance contracts against nonsigners.1 9 The
parties attempting to enforce the contract's provisions against nonsigners
argued that the Sherman Act forbids only agreements restraining trade.
Thus, to preempt the requirement that nonsigners adhere to resale price
maintenance terms in a contract, such adherence must be the equivalent
of an agreement. 1 0 Therefore, under the antitrust exemption in effect at
that time, which immunized resale price maintenance agreements au-
thorized by state law,"' the nonsigner provision was either immunized
by the exemption as an agreement or outside the scope of Section 1 as
lacking an agreement." 2 The Court rejected this argument by reasoning
that the exemption sanctioned consensual agreements and was not price-
fixing accomplished by coercion."13 "[W]hen a state compels retailers to
follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sher-
man Act forbids. . . .[When retailers are forced to abandon price com-
petition, they are driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of the
106. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
108. See Werden & Balmer, supra note 1, at 60. See generally Posner, The Proper
Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L
Rev., 693, 698-703 (1974) (state laws hindering the "spirit" of the Sherman Act may be
preempted though the conflict may not be an express violation).
109. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
110. Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 387.
111. See Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
112. Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 387.
113. See id at 388.
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proviso which forbids 'horizontal' price fixing.""'  Thus, although the
distributor had made no agreement with the nonsigner and there was no
unlawful private action that violated the antitrust laws, preemption oc-
curred. 1 5 This indicates that preemption and liability are not necessarily
coextensive, and that an "agreement" insufficient for liability can cause
preemption.
Further support for an approach focusing on the entire statutory
framework to determine if concerted action is present can be found in
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, "6 in which he first suggested the preemption stan-
dards later accepted by the Court in Rice v. Norman Williams Co. 7
Justice Rehnquist stated in Boulder that the first step in Sherman Act
preemption analysis should be either a determination or assumption
"that the regulatory program would violate the Sherman Act if it were
conceived and operated by private persons.""" Thus, whether the stat-
ute encompasses collaboration or enforces control is not dispositive. The
total effect of the statute should be examined to determine if concerted
action is created. Any concerted action unreasonably restraining inter-
state commerce which is not state action should be preempted.
Several courts appear to accept this principle by holding that statutes
that simply require a party to engage in certain practices might force a
Section 1 violation." 9 One case finding preemption of such a statute,
Lewis Westco & Co. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,20
stated that the proper analysis should focus on "the effect of the statutory
pricing scheme rather than its form."'' This language has been criti-
cized "'22 for going against the guideline in Rice v. Norman Williams Co.
that preemption should not occur "simply because the state scheme
114. Id. at 389 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
115. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, l 209, at 61.
116. 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Compare Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 68-69
& n.5 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) with Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654,
661 (1982) (outlining a two-step violation and state action analysis).
118. Community Communications Co., 455 U.S. at 69 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. See Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374, 378-79 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by preliminarily enjoining
the enforcement of a priceposting statute); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk
Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that a statute resulting in price
exchanges between competitors in an oligopolistic market violated Section 1); Lewis-
Westco & Co. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 136 Cal. App. 3d 829, 839-40,
186 Cal. Rptr. 552, 559-60 (1982) (holding that priceposting statute was preempted by
Section 1), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); ef. Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Nebraska
Liquor Control Comm'n, 217 Neb. 487, 496, 351 N.W.2d 701, 706 (1984) (holding a
prohibition against quantity discounts and limitations on price reductions were price-
fixing statutes violating the due process clause of the state constitution).
120. 136 Cal. App. 3d 829, 840, 186 Cal. Rptr. 552, 560 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
863 (1983).
121. Id. at 835, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (emphasis in original).
122. See Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 120 (D. Or. 1984).
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might have an anticompetitive effect."' 2 3 This criticism may be inter-
preting the Rice guidelines as incorporating into preemption analysis the
liability doctrine that consciously parallel conduct is insufficient to estab-
lish an agreement for liability. 1 4 Yet the basis for the doctrine in the
liability context is that parallel conduct should not be penalized where it
results from independent decisionmaking, 1" 5 unlike the situation where a
statute causes the conduct. The Rice language should be interpreted as
meaning that the potential misuse of a statute by a private party is not a
ground for preemption, and that a statute that does not unreasonably
restrain trade should not be preempted.1 26
An alternate analysis also allowing the preemption of statutes that re-
quire parties to perform particular acts is possible. Miller v. Hedlund'2
7
is a case cited as supporting the proposition that price posting statutes
and post off statutes do not require an agreement and thus could not be
preempted. 128 While there is language to this effect, 129 the case also held
that statutes that require each individual competitor to quote only prices
at delivery and that forbid giving quantity discounts violated the Sher-
man Act.' 30 The court noted that "the State. . . forces all wholesalers
to agree to abide by these restraints as a condition for continuing to do
business . ... ,,13' This was an agreement sufficient for preemption.13 2
The court then noted that the price posting and post off rules also con-
tain "an element of agreement," but that "it is not an antitrust violation
for a number of wholesalers to adhere to their own publically-known
prices."' 133 Thus Miller actually was decided on the ground that the re-
straint did not unreasonably restrain trade. The case suggests that the
implicit agreement between competitors to obey the law is a sufficient
agreement for preemption.
Implicit agreements sufficient for preemption are present in all statu-
tory frameworks requiring concerted action. Several courts have distin-
guished the statute preempted in Midcal from statutes simply requiring
conduct by stating that the resale price maintenance compelled in Midcal
contained an implicit agreement.' 34 If we interpret this to mean that
123. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
124. See Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. 1984).
125. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Par-
allelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 658-59 (1962).
126. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
127. 579 F. Supp. 116 (D. Or. 1984).
128. See Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 173 (2d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985).
129. See Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D. Or. 1984) ("These provisions
are not preempted because as to the essential activity to which they relate-pricing-the
provisions do not require inter-wholesaler agreement or concerted action.").
130. See id, at 121.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 121 n.3.
134. See, eg., Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 172 (2d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985); Enrico's Inc. v. Rice, 551 F. Supp. 511, 514
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only vertical restraints can be preempted, we are forgetting that statutes
requiring horizontal collaboration or allowing some competitors to con-
trol others may be preempted, 135 and that horizontal elements of the stat-
ute in Midcal were also preempted. 36 Limiting preemption to vertical
statutory restraints would result in protecting horizontal restraints,
which are almost universally condemned, and not vertical restraints,
whose anticompetitiveness is debated. 37 If we distinguish Midcal by
simply arguing that only statutes giving private parties control over
others or fostering collaboration may be preempted, we forget the threat
to the policy underlying the agreement requirement whenever concerted
action is present.
Although agreements to obey the law may provide a more comfortable
basis for preemption for some courts, this is an unnecessary fiction. The
better approach would be to evaluate the concerted action brought about
by the statute against the Sherman Act.
V. THE "No AGREEMENT" ANALYSIS AS A STATE ACTION
DETERMINATION
Each step of the Rice preemption analysis addresses different policies.
Establishing a violation ensures that preemption is limited to statutes cre-
ating anticompetitive effects.' 3 The state action doctrine allows states to
regulate in a way that fosters benefits other than competition. 39 When
the state regulates private parties, the state action doctrine requires that
the private parties act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy and
that they be supervised actively by the state.140 If this test is passed, the
state law will not be preempted. Compulsion by a statute is almost con-
(N.D. Cal. 1982), vacated as moot, 730 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1984); United States Brewers
Ass'n v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1329 (D. Conn.), rev'don other grounds, 692 F.2d 275
(2d Cir. 1982), ajfd, 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
135. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
137. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 70 (1977) (White,
J., concurring) (arguing that the majority's holding that nonprice vertical restraints
should be subject to the rule of reason because such restraints can be procompetitive
might also apply to vertical price restraints for the same reason). See also Battipaglia v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 179 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985).
138. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 1 212.13, at 53 n.3 (Supp. 1982) (an anticompetitive
effect that is not a violation should not cause preemption). See supra note 45.
139. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 212a, at 69 (Part of the rationale of
the Parker case was that applying the Sherman Act to states would have removed their
authority "to adopt other than a regime of competition."); Page, Antitrust, Federalism,
and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption
After MidcalAluminum, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 1099, 1104-09 (1981) (the state action doctrine
was developed as part of the movement away from substantive due process invalidation of
state law and toward deference to considered state economic choices).
140. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1727-29 (1985) (describing Midcal test and holding it applies to private parties).
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clusive evidence that the act follows state policy, 4 ' but may not suffi-
ciently satisfy the supervision requirement.'42
The question addressed by the supervision prong of the state action
doctrine is "whether the operative decisions about the challenged con-
duct are made by public authorities or by the private parties them-
selves."' 43 Professors Areeda and Turner discuss situations in which
"the initial legislative decision may leave nothing further to be decided
by the relevant private parties, as well as nothing for the state to super-
vise."'" These statutes are characterized as "self executing" because
"the initial enactment would be a legislative decision that would itself
satisfy the supervision requirement."' 45 Thus a self-executing statute
that compelled conduct would qualify as state action.
This Note suggests that courts saying that preemption is precluded
because no agreement is present actually mean that the statute is self-
executing and that all conduct pursuant to it is therefore state action.
The "no agreement" analysis is concerned with the fact that any an-
ticompetitive concerted action regarding prices is a product of private
decisions.'46 But rule of reason analysis is sufficiently sophisticated to
condemn agreements regarding practices that are only indirectly con-
141. Id. at 1729; see Town ofHallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1720 (1985).
142. See P. Areeda, supra note 45, 212.5, at 60.
143. P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 213b, at 73. ,
144. Id 213d, at 76.
145. Id.; see Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 1982)
(describing a trade screening requirement as self-executing and therefore satisfying the
supervision prong). It is unclear what constitutes sufficient supervision. See Battipaglia
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1393 (1985). Compare Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 355 (2d
Cir. 1981) (enforcement of a detailed statutory pricing mechanism should be sufficient
supervision) with Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1982) (examination of the prices posted to determine if they are reasonable is neces-
sary). Resolution of this issue is necessary to determine the type of statute that can be
self-executing. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458
U.S. 654, 665 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) sets out an analysis that
indicates that certain statutes are always state action. If a statute contemplates a private
market decision enforced by a nonmarket mechanism, the court determines whether the
power given to the private party creates an unacceptable and unnecessary risk of an-
ticompetitive efflect by giving an unreasonable degree of unsupervised power to regulate to
the private party. Id at 668-69 (Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment). A public regu-
latory scheme, which does not grant private parties any private regulatory power, is per-
missible. Id at 665 n.1 & 667 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). It appears
that Justice Stevens' public regulatory scheme is the equivalent of a self-executing statute,
because both focus on the lack of any supervision problems.
146. See, eg., Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D. Or. 1984) ("[T]here is no
reason why the. . . price. . . should not gravitate down to its most competitive level,
absent some sort of private agreement to use the regulations for anticompetitive pur-
poses.") (emphasis in original); Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d
330, 335 (Minn. 1984) (whether to amend prices is a decision left to the individual whole-
saler); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W. 2d 416, 418 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) (any price change by wholesalers pursuant to the statute is based on their independ-
ent judgment), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984).
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cerned with the price or output of a product.147 Judicial experience has
found certain restraints with such indirect effects to be so anticompetitive
that they are subject to the per se rule.148 Economic analysis of the rele-
vant market should determine the scope of the effects of a restraint that is
examined for preemption purposes. 149 Then the state action doctrine will
determine who is making the decisions regarding the restraint and what
aspects of the restraint should be proteced by state action.150 These de-
terminations should not be made when a court analyzes whether viola-
tive conduct is caused by the statute.
Resolving state action issues by holding that no violation is present
causes problems. The "no agreement" analysis seems to immunize auto-
matically any statutory arrangement, of any governmental body, that
merely requires conduct. This Note has argued that such statutes may
impinge on congressional objectives, and that sorting between those that
do and do not should be done by investigating the degree of anticompeti-
tive effect and by applying the state action doctrine. For example, a mu-
nicipal statute that was self-executing at the city government level still
might not follow any clearly articulated state policy and thus would not
be state action.' 51 Protecting such a statute would be unjustified.
147. This is seen in the Supreme Court's cases regarding data dissemination. See
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (irresistable inference
that a casual agreement to exchange price information would stabilize prices); United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923) (price information ex-
change had the "necessary tendency" of suppressing competition); American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (1921) (exchange of price information
did not have a definite agreement as to production and prices, but this was supplied by
man's "inherent disposition to make all the money possible").
148. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (horizontal market
division, whether or not accompanied by other restraints, is per se illegal).
149. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. An alternative that precludes pre-
emption where a private party had the option to act competitively could arguably be
justified by the Supreme Court's language regarding hypothetical conflict, see supra note
30 and accompanying text, and by the presumption against the preemption of state law
by federal law. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960);
Handler, supra note 14, at 1380. However, the logical result of such an approach would
be to limit severely rule of reason preemption. This is because any statutory practice not
a per se violation and not otherwise directly concerned with price or output would be
presumed to not cause the self interested anticompetitive decisions of private parties
where procompetitive decisions were possible. It would create an arbitrary distinction
among restraints that indirectly affect price and output by only preempting those that
almost always are unreasonably anticompetitive, and therefore are subject to per se rules,
and those that are anticompetitive in only certain markets, and are therefore subject to
the rule of reason. This approach would also limit the protection of antitrust policies to
finding liability. This approach would ignore the cause and effect relationships accepted
in the context of private liability.
150. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943), the seminal state action case, see supra note 10, in making the determination that
the statute was state action outside the scope of the antitrust laws, the Court stated that
the challenged statute "was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or
combination." See id. at 350-51. This suggests that the lack of enforcement of private
decisions by a statute is an element of the state action determination.
151. To be state action, anticompetitive conduct authorized by a city must be pursuant
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Several courts appear to recognize implicitly the danger of automatic
immunization of statutes that merely require conduct by reserving judg-
ment on whether the rule of reason analysis might show sufficient agree-
ment for preemption.152 However, it is possible that courts, despite proof
that statutory concerted action created anticompetitive effects, 53 still
might find the preemption issue resolved by the fact that the statute does
not facially require an agreement between the parties." One court do-
ing this left open the possibility that private liability was still available.155
Yet obtaining evidence of a tacit private agreement where the statutory
framework provides all the mechanics of carrying it out might be diffi-
cult. Where the anticompetitive result is inevitable due to market condi-
tions, the statute should be held in conflict with the Sherman Act, so that
the statutory framework will have to satisfy the state action doctrine to
to a clearly articulated state policy. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct.
1713, 1721 (1985). For a case discussing, without deciding, the possibility that a city rent
control law may be saved because it does not require any agreement, see Fisher v. City of
Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, -_ & nn.10-11, 693 P.2d 261, 276-77 & nn. 10-11,209 Cal. Rptr.
682, 697-98 & nn.10-1 1 (1984) (en banc), prob. jurisdiction noted, 105 S. Ct. 2653 (1985).
It might be possible to argue that government regulation of private parties forms a single
enterprise incapable of conspiring, as in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984) (holding that a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary
are incapable of conspiring). However, the Court found that the parent-subsidiary coor-
dinated conduct was a single enterprise because they had complete unity of interest and
common objectives guided or determined by a single corporate consciousness. Id. at
2742. While a state's comprehensive regulation completely controlling a business would
be immune from the Sherman Act, the reason for this would be the supervision provided,
which satisfies the state action doctrine. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 106 & n.9 (1980). Where a statute requires all market
participants to engage in a particular practice, the market participants retain sufficient
freedom of action to prevent duplicating the situation characterized in Coppern'eld.
Where no freedom of action is left, while private parties may argue the Copperweld rule,
governmental bodies should be distinguished because of their power to compel adherence
and thus should be required to meet the state action tests.
152. See Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Director of the
N.M. Dep't. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, _, 668 P.2d 1093, 1099
(1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1581 (1984); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel,
666 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984). Miller v.
Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116 (D. Or. 1984), discussed supra notes 131-36 and accompany-
ing text, recognized this danger by saying that the "no agreement" approach, "[t]aken to
its extreme,. . . would uphold any state regulatory scheme that mandated any private
action." Id at 121. The court distinguished a priceposting and adherence statute, which
lacked an agreement, from delivered pricing requirements and prohibitions on quantity
discounts, which had an agreement, on the grounds that the delivered price/quantity
discount statutes were per se violations. Ide This appears to be the approach discussed
and discredited supra note 149.
153. See Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn. 1984)
(trial court found that the price posting system tended to fix prices at an artificially high
level).
154. See id at 335.
155. See id (If the statute has been used to facilitate price fixing, "the conspirators
may not invoke the statute to insulate their conduct from scrutiny under the Sherman
Act."). Such language indicates that the analytical framework underlying Intercontinen-
tal may be that approach discussed and discredited supra note 149.
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avoid preemption.1 56  Otherwise, the protection of antitrust policies
would be limited to finding liable those parties who make their tacit
agreements too explicit. This Note has argued that rule of reason pre-
emption analysis should focus on whether the practice required has led to
anticompetitive results in the particular market, not whether it took
some private coordination to do so.
VI. ENSURING FAIRNESS: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A VIOLATION
LEADING TO PREEMPTION AND A VIOLATION LEADING
TO LIABILITY
The preemption analysis suggested by this Note would broaden the
categories of statutes in which preemption might be found. Because pri-
vate antitrust liability might follow, courts might hesitate to find the "vi-
olations" required by Rice where private parties were compelled to
perform certain acts. Such reluctance is unjustified. A violation suffi-
cient for preemption would not necessarily mean antitrust liability for the
regulated market participants.
First, the state action doctrine provides safeguards where both pre-
emption and liability are at issue. The doctrine allows states to promote
policies other than competition.'i 7 It also protects private party conduct
mandated by state law from antitrust liability.
1 58
It is possible, however, that the compelled conduct of a private party
may be insufficiently supervised and therefore not state action. 5 9 Profes-
156. This approach would resolve the divergent treatments of statutes requiring price
posting and adherence to those prices. See supra note 58. The disagreement stems from
the Supreme Court's unusual treatment of agreements to post and adhere to prices. A
private agreement to post prices and adhere to them was struck down in Sugar Inst. v.
United States, 297 U.S. 553, 601 (1936), and was described as a per se violation in dictum
in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam) (dictum).
However, Suger Institute specifically based its holding on the oligopolistic nature of the
sugar market. See Sugar Institute, 297 U.S. at 600 (a small number of refiners refine
practically all of the imported raw sugar processed in this country). An agreement to
exchange presale price information in an oligopolistic market was also condemned in
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1969). Thus, some may
regard price exchanges with adherence to the prices exchanged as per se unlawful if the
market is oligopolistic. Preemption analysis regarding price posting should undertake
limited market analysis to determine if the market is oligopolistic. If so, the statute
should be preempted if it does not satisfy the state action test. This is the approach taken
in Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 15-16 (E.D.N.C.
1983). If not, no preemption should occur without full rule of reason analysis. Market
analysis is not always precluded by a per se rule. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 n.26 (1984) (dictum).
157. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 212, at 69. See also Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing the problems, with respect to cities, of a preemption approach that fo-
cused solely on the effect of competition).
158. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721,
1729 (1985).
159. Where the state compels private parties to collaborate, or compels one private
party to obey another private party, the state must supervise the results. See supra notes
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sors Areeda and Turner suggest a variety of circumstances, in addition to
state action, where private parties should not be liable for damages. If
there were no substantial reason to believe a challenged act was unlawful
at the time of the private party's conduct, or where the private party was
"formally invited, approved, or directed. . . by state law and its agen-
cies and instrumentalities" acting within their apparent authority, then
no damages should be awarded."W The Supreme Court has suggested
that liability should hinge on whether a party exercised sufficient free-
dom of choice to warrant making him liable for his actions. 16 In certain
cases, preemption might occur because imposing certain conduct on a
particular market in ways that did not satisfy the state action doctrine
would create an irresistible pressure to violate the law. Yet that irresisti-
ble pressure is the party's own self interest, therefore making him suffi-
ciently independent to warrant liability.
In addition, a private party could argue that preemption and liability
prerequisites for an agreement are different. As in Schwegmann, conduct
that was not subject to liability could still be sufficient for preemption.
CONCLUSION
Statutes requiring market participants to engage in particular conduct
can threaten the congressional objectives underlying the agreement re-
quirement of Section 1 whether or not that conduct involves collabora-
tion with or control over another party. The concerted action required
should move the inquiry to the anticompetitive effect of the conduct and
whether that conduct is state action.
Courts that end preemption analysis when the conduct does not in-
volve another party misconstrue Supreme Court precedents regarding
preemption analysis. They raise concerns that are better addressed under
the state action doctrine. Finding an agreement sufficient for preemption
does not raise the spectre of conduct compelled under state law creating
private antitrust liability. The state action doctrine will immunize cer-
tain such conduct. A fairness defense may immunize a broader category
of conduct. Finally, agreements for preemption and liability purposes
may well be different, thus providing further protection.
Anders Laren
66-93 and accompanying text. Where the state compels particular, well-defined acts, the
type of supervision required is unclear. See supra note 145.
160. See P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 19, 217b, at 108. See also Wainright v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567, 574-75 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (statute invali-
dated by the state constitution provides a valid state action defense).
161. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976).

